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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20030241-SC

vs.
NORM SMITH,
Defendant/Petitioner.

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S POSITION SEEKS TO NULLIFY THE PLAIN AND
UNAMBIGUOUS LEGISLATIVE INTENTIVE FOUND IN UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED § 764-402

The State readily admits that "aggravated assault qualifies as a lesser included
offense of felony use of a concealed weapon" (Br. of Respondent at 14). However, the
State ultimately argues that this Court should break away from traditional merger analysis
and instead determine that merger is inappropriate whenever the predicate offense acts as
an enhancement to the underlying offense (Br. of Respondent at 14-17). Utah Code
Annotated § 76-1-402 demands that under the facts of this case, aggravated assault merge
with carrying a concealed weapon.
Without referencing any legislative records or statutes, the State claims that the
legislature intended aggravated assault "remain separate from the concealed weapon
charge" (Br. of Respondent at 15). However, the State is unable to show that the

legislature intended this result. In fact, the legislature explicitly intended, according to
the plain language of § 76-1-402(3), for the two crimes to merge. Utah law is clear and
unmistakable on divining legislative intent: "Where statutory language is plain and
unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. Instead, we are
guided by the rule that a statute should be construed according to its plain language."
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988).
As already shown in the original Brief, the plain and unambiguous language of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-402 mandates that this Court find that Smith can not be
convicted of both aggravated assault and carrying a concealed weapon under these facts
(Br. of Petitioner at 18-20). In an attempt to circumvent § 76-1-402, the State urges this
Court to utterly ignore the plain, unambiguous legislative language found in § 76-1-402
and instead make all enhancing offenses remain separate from the underlying offense
(See Br. of Respondent at 16-17). The State's position effectively makes the
Legislature's intended effects of § 76-1-402 null and void.
In summary, the Legislature understands the doctrine of merger and lesser
included offenses. Moreover, the Legislature knows exactly how to make separate
charges which occur during a single criminal episode constitute separate offenses to
which merger does not apply. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202, 76-8-508(1), 76-8508.3; see also Br. of Petitioner at 19. The State's position would effectively nullify §
76-1-402, thereby completely ignoring its plain and unambiguous language, which is
most determinative of the legislative intent. Accordingly, this Court should find that
under the facts of this case, aggravated assault merges with carrying a concealed weapon.
2

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REMANDING THE
CONCEALED WEAPON CHARGE FOR A NEW TRIAL

The State first claims that Smith's trial counsel was not ineffective when he failed
to move for a directed verdict after the State rested without introducing any evidence that
defendant did not have a concealed firearm permit because "lack of a concealed firearm
permit is not an element of the concealed weapons offense" (Br. of Respondent at 18).
Smith wall address this argument in Point III, infra.
The State next claims that even if Smith had moved for a directed verdict at trial,
the trial court could have reopened the case in order to allow the State to provide "the
missing evidence" (Br. of Respondent at 19). The Court of Appeals properly rejected this
argument, finding that there was no evidence the trial court would reopen the case since
the State "obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of the crime...." State v.
Smith, 2003 UT App 52, \ 35, 65 P.3d 648.
Finally, the State claims that the error by trial counsel for not moving for a
directed verdict when the evidence was insufficient to convict Smith on the concealed
weapon charge requires remanding for a new trial instead of dismissing the case with
prejudice (Br. of Respondent at 20). However, the State is unable to support this
assertion by any relevant case law. The proper remedy for setting aside a conviction
when the evidence was insufficient to support the charge is a dismissal with prejudice.
See State v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 n.l (Utah App. 1990).

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that "[pjursuant to both section 76-10504(1 )(b) and jury instruction #13D...., the State presented no evidence [in its case in
chief] that Smith lacked such a permit." Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at ^f 32. If trial counsel
had moved for a directed verdict on this charge, there is no question it would have been
granted. Although the Court of Appeals framed its decision around "ineffective
assistance of counsel," the ultimate decision was based on the premise that the evidence
was insufficient to support the charge. And the effect of an evidentiary insufficiency
finding on appeal is that double jeopardy bars retrial. See Burks v. United States, 437
U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). Because the true basis for reversal was
insufficient evidence, double jeopardy bars retrial.

III.

BOTH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-10-504(l)(b) AND JURY
INSTRUCTION #13D REQUIRED THE STATE TO PROVE, AS AN
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE, THAT SMITH DID NOT HAVE A
VALID CONCEALED FIREARM PERMIT

The State fails to acknowledge that the Court of Appeals based its finding on
"both section 76-10-504(1 )(b) and jury instruction #13D" and not solely on Utah Code
Annotated § 76-10-504(1 )(b). Jury instruction #13D specifically required the State to
prove that Smith lacked a valid concealed weapons permit in order to overcome the proof
beyond reasonable doubt standard. It is too late for the State to argue it was not required
to give evidence that Smith lacked a valid concealed weapons permit when the jury
instruction required the State to do so.
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Moreover, the plain and unambiguous language of § 76-10-504(1 )(b) and
subsection (3) requires the State to prove that Smith was a "person without a valid
concealed firearm permit...." The State finally accepts that when interpreting a statute,
the statute's "plain language is to be read as a whole...." (Br. of Respondent at 24;
quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, \ 8, 63 P.3d 667).1 However, the State proceeds
to give a lengthy discourse in another attempt to divine legislative intent even though the
statutory language is plain and unambiguous.
The State claims that if § 76-10-504(l)(b) is interpreted according to its plain and
unambiguous meaning, then Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-523 would be rendered
"inoperative" (Br. of Respondent at 25). Such is not the case. § 76-10-504(l)(b) simply
includes as an element of the offense that the person not have a "valid concealed firearm
permit." Additionally, subsection (3) states: "If the concealed firearm is used in a
commission of a violent felony...." (emphasis added). Reading the entire statute as a
whole, subsection (3) refers back to subsection (l)(b), which requires the additional
element of proving the lack of a valid firearm permit. The Court of Appeals correctly
interpreted § 76-10-504, reading both subsections (l)(b) and (3) together, as the plain
language clearly requires. See Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at f 32, n.7.

1

Schofield states in whole, "When interpreting statutes, we determine the statute's

meaning by first looking to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain
language unless the language is ambiguous." 2002 UT 132 at T| 8 (citation omitted).

The State also claims that if the statute is interpreted according to its plain
meaning, the State will bear the "impossible" burden of proving the absence of a valid
permit (Br. of Respondent at 27). However, the State fails to explain why it would be
difficult or impossible to prove that a person lacks a valid permit. Surely permits are
registered and such information is available to law enforcement for legal purposes.
Moreover, it does not matter whether this Court considers the plain language of § 76-10504 unwise; it is the prerogative of the legislature to amend the Code, not this Court.
In summary, this Court can decide this issue in favor of Smith based solely on jury
instruction #13D, since this instruction included as an element of the offense that Smith
lacked a valid firearm permit. The State failed to prove this necessary element in its case
in chief and defendant would have been entitled to a dismissal based on the insufficient
evidence. Therefore, this Court should affirm this part of the Court of Appeals' decision.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DID NOT SHIFT THE
BURDEN OF PROVING PREJUDICE

The State claims that the Court of Appeals' decision impermissibly shifted the
burden of proving prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel claim (Br. of
Respondent at 27). This claim is without merit. The State is unable to cite to any
language by the Court of Appeals that shifts the burden of proof to the State. The State
can only support this claim by taking the Court of Appeals' holding out of context. The
Court of Appeals simply held,
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... [W]e conclude that "but for counsel's deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different."
(quotation and citation omitted). Had trial counsel raised this lack of evidence,
there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have dismissed the
concealed weapon charge.
Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at ^ 34. The Court of Appeals further stated,
A trial court has discretionary authority to determine whether to reopen a case to
admit additional evidence. See State v. Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 124 (1942). Here,
where the State obviously failed to introduce a necessary element of the crime, we
are not convinced that the trial court would have necessarily allowed the State to
reopen its case and supply the missing evidence."
M a t Tf 35.
The Court of Appeals made no statement which would shift the burden of
demonstrating prejudice from Smith to the State. In fact, the opposite it true. The Court
of Appeals specifically stated, "To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show ... there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different." Smith, 2003 UT App 52 at ^ 31 (quoting Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT
72, ]f 19, 61 P.3d 978) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Court of Appeals implicitly
commented on Smith satisfying his burden when it found trial counsel's performance "so
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness" and where if found the
insufficiency of the evidence "obvious[]". Id. at Iffi 33, 35.

Accordingly, because the Court of Appeals emphatically stated that the burden of
showing prejudice lied solely with Smith and implicitly found that he satisfied this
burden, the State's argument fails.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Smith respectfully asks this Court to affirm the Court of
Appeals' decision that the evidence was insufficient to convict Smith for carrying a
concealed weapon, but to reverse the Court of Appeals' decision that the case be
remanded for a new trial and to reverse the decision that the two aggravated assault
charges did not merge with the second degree felony use of a concealed weapon.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22 day of September, 2004.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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